

## Why Low-Income Citizens Are Protectionist Consumers:

### A Research Note on JGSS-2008

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#### 低所得者層はなぜ「保護主義的な消費者」なのか

- JGSS-2008 の分析から -

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What determines the attitude of low-income citizens toward globalization during the world financial crisis in advanced industrialized nations? The question raises an intriguing paradox as low-income citizens face the higher threat of losing jobs *and* reap greater benefits from cheaper goods imported from abroad during the economic crisis. This research note addresses this question by summarizing the results from the nationally-representative survey in Japan (JGSS-2008) which asked respondents to assess the effect of globalization on their job security and their consumer lives. I demonstrate that low-income citizens are more protectionist not just from their occupational point of view, but also from their consumer perspective, controlling for education and other socio-economic characteristics. After verifying this puzzle, the note tests two hypotheses for why this is so: (i) “spill-over hypothesis” that low-income citizens’ concerns for job security spill over to their attitudes toward globalization as consumers and (ii) “information/knowledge hypothesis” that low-income are not sufficiently aware of the consumer benefits they reap from globalization. The results lend some support to the information argument, but disconfirm the spill-over hypothesis.

Key Words: JGSS, low income class, globalization

世界金融危機下の先進諸国において、低所得者層のグローバル化に対する態度を規定する要因は何であろうか。この問いは興味深いパラドックスを提示する。先進諸国の低所得者層はグローバル化によって職を失うリスクが高まる反面、消費者としては低価格な輸入品の恩恵を最も享受する層と考えられるからである。この研究ノートは、グローバル化が人々の生活の様々な側面に与える影響をより包括的に問うた JGSS-2008 の分析を通じて得た、二つの知見を論ずる。第一点は、既存の貿易理論の知見に反し、日本の低所得者層は中・高所得者層と比べ、グローバル化は回答者自身の消費生活にとってよくないことであると考えている。第二点は、なぜ低所得者層が保護主義的な消費者なのかについて、二つの仮説（伝播仮説、情報仮説）の検証を行い、経済的には低価格な輸入品によって恩恵を享受するはずの人々が、なぜ保護主義的になるのかを明らかにした。

キーワード：JGSS，低所得層，グローバル化

## 1. Introduction

What determines the attitude of low-income citizens toward globalization – the increasing movement of goods, capital, and labor across national borders – in advanced industrialized nations? The question is especially important today because the global financial crisis has posed a particular threat to job security for low-skilled and low-income citizens through company restructuring and layoffs. Protectionist forces have indeed gained a stronger voice as evidenced by U.S. President Obama’s Buy-American legislation and stalled negotiations at the WTO Doha Round.

The question raises an intriguing paradox. According to the predictions provided by the Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo-Viner trade theories, low-income and low-skilled citizens in advanced industrialized nations should face a higher threat of losing their jobs and declining wages due to globalization (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). These theories predict that low-income and low-skilled citizens will oppose globalization to protect their occupational interests. If we shift our focus to the consumption side, however, low-income citizens are *the* prime beneficiaries of globalization as consumers who benefit from cheaper and a wider variety of goods imported from abroad, most notably from developing economies (see Broda, Leibtag and Weinstein 2009). Indeed, in the history of trade politics, low-income workers have been the primary actors pushing for cheaper food. Thus, in theory, low-income citizens should be torn between conflicting attitudes toward globalization depending on which aspect of their lives they weigh more heavily: occupational interests (“protectionism”) or consumption interests (“free trade”). How do low-income citizens decide between their conflicting and multifaceted interests as producers vs. consumers?

To answer this question, this research note summarizes preliminary results from a nationally-representative survey conducted by JGSS in Japan during the fall of 2008 just when the global financial crisis erupted. In JGSS-2008, I designed novel survey instruments that allow us to answer this question in two ways. First, the question asks respondents to assess their views about the effect of globalization on the following six different aspects of their lives: Japanese economy; job security of Japanese citizens in general; job security of the respondent him/herself; Japanese consumers; consumption activities of the respondent him/herself; and the environment. This allows us to see how a respondent’s assessment of globalization differs when they consider it from an occupational (job-related) perspective versus a consumer perspective. Second, the questionnaires ask respondents to assess this effect on their own lives (*e.g.*, “your job opportunity and stability” and “your consumption activities”) as well as on the general population in Japan (*e.g.*, “job opportunity of the Japanese” and “consumption activities of the Japanese”). This allows scholars to test what types of citizens form attitudes socio-tropically, while others form them from self-interests.

The remainder of this note proceeds in three steps. First, I demonstrate that low-income citizens are more protectionist not just from their occupational point of view, but also from their consumer perspective, controlling for education and other socio-economic characteristics. This poses a puzzle because as consumers, we would expect low-income citizens to be the prime beneficiaries of globalization. To the contrary, we find that low-income citizens are consistently more protectionist in their responses to a wide range of questions regarding the effect of globalization on their job security, environment, and consumption. On the other hand, I demonstrate that high-income and highly-educated respondents vary their responses among questions regarding the effect of globalization on their job security and consumption activities.

After systematically verifying the existence of this puzzle, this note then tests two hypotheses that account for the paradox that the low-income citizens are protectionist consumers: (i) “spill-over hypothesis” that low-income citizens’ concerns for job security spill over to their attitudes toward

globalization as consumers and (ii) “information/knowledge hypothesis” that low-income or less-educated citizens are not sufficiently aware of the consumer benefits they reap from globalization. The results lend some support to the information/knowledge hypothesis and reject the spill-over argument.

The results have broader implications for three distinct and important areas of the literature. First, while trade economists have assumed that consumers are free traders, empirical verification of this assumption has lagged far behind the formal modeling (Baker 2005). This note shows that low-income citizens are the ones that are paradoxically *more* protectionist as consumers and I seek to explain why. Second, the existing public opinion research generally does not allow us to get at how respondents assess the same phenomena (*e.g.*, globalization) from multifaceted perspectives (*e.g.*, their jobs vs. their consumption) and how and why they differ. Novel survey instruments I designed for JGSS-2008 help us address this neglected question. Finally, this note speaks to a larger debate regarding why citizens often support policies that could harm their own interests.

## 2. JGSS-2008 Survey Design and Instruments

Two issues have stalled the progress in empirical research on public attitudes toward globalization. The first issue is the generic nature of the survey instruments used in the existing public opinion surveys on globalization and trade. Very few surveys have asked respondents to assess their opinions on the effect of globalization on various aspects of their lives. In particular, surveys neglect how the public assesses the effect of globalization on their consumption activities. This neglect is problematic as production and consumption are two pillars of economic activities that the majority of citizens engage in.

The second issue is the fact that most of us are producers and consumers at the same time. The multifaceted characteristics of citizens have complicated the analysis. How survey instruments are framed have tended to generate a substantial difference in responses (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Hiscox 2006). This raises a question about the comparability across surveys, and more seriously, whether scholars can trust public opinion surveys. This framing effect is conventionally attributed to a function of the “manipulability of respondents” proxied by respondents’ levels of education, information and knowledge, and the strength of prior beliefs. However, some of the “framing effects” that scholars identify in experimental surveys might arise *not* due to the manipulability of citizens, but due to the differences in their *partial* assessment of the effect of globalization on various aspects of their lives (*e.g.*, job security, consumption, environment, the U.S. economy, and community)(Naoi and Kume 2009). For instance, low-income citizens might consider that globalization is bad for their job opportunity, yet consider it is to be good for their consumption activities by making the cheaper goods available for them.

I addressed these problems in a nationally-representative JGSS-2008 survey in two ways. First, the JGSS-2008 survey instruments are among of the most comprehensive asking respondents to assess the effect of globalization on six different aspects of their lives: Japanese economy; job opportunity of Japanese in general; your own job opportunity; Japanese consumers; your own consumption activities; and the environment. This allows me to address the neglect of consumer preferences in the literature on trade and globalization (Naoi and Kume 2009). Second, the questionnaires ask respondents to assess this effect on their own lives (*e.g.*, “your job opportunity and stability”) as well as on the general population in Japan (*e.g.*, “job opportunity of the Japanese” and “consumption activities of the Japanese”). This allows us to test what types of citizens form attitudes socio-tropically, while others form them from self-interests.

The question wording is: “Mobility of people, goods, and capital etc. has been increasing among countries/regions, do you think it is good or bad for...” (Q59) and the six items are: A: Japanese economy, B: Job opportunities for Japanese workers, C: Japanese environment, D: Consumers in Japan, E: Your own job opportunity or stability, F: For your own life as a consumer. Respondents choose an answer from the seven-point scale: 1. Very good, 2. Good, 3. Somewhat good, 4. Neither good or bad, 5. Somewhat bad, 6. Bad, 7. Very bad, and 8. Can’t choose.

### 3. The Puzzle: Low-Income Citizens as Protectionist Consumers

The Figures below show respondents’ assessment of the effect of globalization on their own consumption (Figure 1) and on Japanese consumers (Figure 2) categorized by respondents’ income level (high: top 33%; low: bottom 33%; middle 34%). Two points stand out. First, the bottom one-third of low-income respondents, who should be the primary beneficiaries of globalization, are more likely to think that globalization is bad for their own consumption and for Japanese consumers. Second, the proportion of “neutral” answers (4:Neither good or bad), which constitutes the highest proportion of responses, is higher at average 52.4% when respondents are asked about the effect of globalization on their own consumption compared to 41% when asked about the effect on Japanese consumers in general. This poses a puzzle as we would expect that respondents should be more aware of the effect of globalization on their own lives as opposed to its overall effects on Japanese consumers *per se*.




Figure 1: The Effect of Globalization on Your Consumption




Figure 2: The Effect of Globalization on Japanese Consumers

The Figures below summarize respondents’ assessment of the effect of globalization on their own job security (Figure 3) and on job security of Japanese (Figure 4) categorized by respondents’ income level. Three points stand out.

First, the bottom one-third respondents with the lowest income are indeed more protectionist than middle or high-income respondents. Second, the proportion of “neutral” answers is substantially higher for respondents’ assessment of the effect of globalization on their own job opportunities than their own consumption activities (see Figure 1 and 3).

Finally, the proportion of “neutral” answers is much higher at 62.4% when respondents are asked about globalization’s effect on their own job opportunity than when asked about its effect on the job opportunities of Japanese in general (36.8%) (see Figure 3 and 4).




Figure 3: The Effect on Your Job Opportunities




Figure 4: The Effect on Job Opportunities of Japanese

This fact is harder to grasp in light of existing literature on individual attitudes toward trade and globalization. Two prominent models of trade, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and Ricardo-Viner models, both derive public's attitudes from their occupational characteristics such as income, sector of employment, and skill levels. Yet, the simple descriptive statistics above illustrate that respondents are more uncertain or ambiguous about the effect of globalization on their own job opportunity than its effect on their own consumption activities. This result challenges the following two assumptions of the existing literature: (i) occupational profiles are important; and (ii) individuals are well aware of their occupational benefit or loss from globalization (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). The next section will confirm these patterns more systematically with individual-level analysis.

## 4. Systematic Confirmation of the Puzzle: Ordered Logit Analyses

### 4.1. Low-Income Citizens as Protectionist Consumers

Tables 1 summarizes the results of ordered logit analysis on individual assessment of the effect of globalization on their own consumption. To check for the robustness of the results, models (1) to (3) use respondents' individual income, and models (4) and (5) use their household income. Among the five models, models (1), (2), and (4) include all the respondents with or without jobs, while model (3) and (5) only include those who have jobs. In addition to testing the effect of income, I include a battery of controls listed below, i.e., individual attributes that are believed to influence public's attitudes toward globalization.

*Income*: is a respondent's reported income and ranges from zero to three: 0 (no income), 1 (bottom 33% of all income-earning respondents), 2 (middle 33%), and 3 (top 33% of all income-earning respondents). In models (3) and (5) of Table 1 and Table 2, *Income* ranges from 1 to 3 (low, mid, and high income) as I excluded respondents without income. In models (4) and (5) of Table 1 and 2, I use tri-chotomized variable (1: bottom 33%, 2: middle 34%, and 3: top 33%) for respondent's household income.

*No Income*: is a dummy variable one if a respondent earns no income, and zero otherwise.

*IncomeLow*: is a dummy variable one if a respondent's individual income is bottom 33% of those who have jobs, and zero otherwise.

*IncomeHigh*: is a dummy variable one if a respondent's individual income is top 33% and zero otherwise. Mid-income group is a base-category.

*College*: is a dummy variable one if a respondent graduated from a four-year college or beyond, zero

otherwise.

*Age*: is a biological age of a respondent ranging from 20 to 89.

*Diff\_Jobs*: is a respondent's self-assessment of difficulty finding a comparable job if s/he quits the current job and ranges from one (easy) to three (very difficult).

*LoseJob*: is a respondent's self-assessment of probability of him/her losing the current job in the next one year and ranges from one (not at all likely) to four (very likely).

*Female*: is a dummy variable one if a respondent is a female, and zero otherwise.

*Temp*: is a dummy variable one if a respondent has a part-time or temporary job, and zero otherwise.

*Married*: is a dummy variable one if a respondent is currently married and zero otherwise.

*LiveKids*: is a dummy variable one if a respondent lives with children under the age 18, and zero otherwise.

*Grocery*: is a dummy variable one if a respondent goes to grocery shopping often and zero otherwise.

*LDP Support*: is a dummy variable one if a respondent supports the LDP and zero otherwise.

*Political*: is a dummy variable one if a respondent is a member of any political organization.

*CoopMem*: is a dummy variable one if a respondent is a Co-op member and zero otherwise.

*OwnHouse*: is a dummy variable one if a respondent owns home and zero otherwise.

*No Foreign*: is a dummy variable one if a respondent's company or industry does not export, import, or produce goods abroad and zero otherwise.

*LaborUnion*: is a dummy variable one if a respondent is a labor union member and zero otherwise.

*Ideology*: is a respondent's location of his/her ideological position ranging from one (conservative) to five (progressive).

Table 1 suggests that citizens from the bottom 33% of the income distribution are indeed more protectionist in their assessment of the effect of globalization on their consumption activities at a 99% significance level. The results are robust across the five models with individual or household income and analyzing all respondents or only respondents with jobs.

Respondents with a college education or higher (*College*) are less protectionist than those without it. The job security of respondents, as measured by job status and self-assessed likelihood of finding a comparable job and losing their current job in the next year, does not have systematic effects on respondents' assessment of globalization's effect on their own consumption. Higher age (*Age*) is the only variable that is systematically associated with more protectionist assessment. Those who live with children under the age 18 are more likely to think globalization is bad for their consumer lives, probably due to the safety and quality concerns. Overall, the results do not lend support to the spill-over hypothesis: respondents with higher job insecurity are not the ones who think that globalization is bad for their consumer lives.

#### **4.2. Low-Income Citizens are Protectionist due to Job Security Concerns**

Table 2 summarizes the determinants of respondents' assessment of the effect of globalization on their own job opportunity or stability. Like Table 1, models (1) to (3) use respondent's individual income and models (4) and (5) use household income. Among the five models, models (1), (2), and (4) include all the respondents, while model (3) and (5) only include those who have jobs. Consistent with the prediction offered by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, low-income respondents are more likely to think that globalization is bad for their job opportunity and this effect is significant at 95% to 99% levels. Yet when using a dummy variable for each of the four income category (0: no income, 1: low, 2: middle, 3: high and 2: middle income is excluded to serve as a base category), it is the top

33% of total income-earning respondents who are likely to think that globalization is good for their job opportunities and stability compared to the middle-income category. Low-income respondents are no more protectionist than the middle-income group in their assessment.

*College* is associated with the attitude that globalization is good for respondents' own jobs, although this effect is absent from the model (5) that uses household income and limits the analysis to working respondents. Higher age is associated with more a protectionist assessment. Surprisingly, none of the measures for job insecurity except for age turns out to have systematic effects on respondents' assessment of globalization on their job opportunity and stability. Those who work for companies or industries that do not export, import, or produce goods abroad (*NoForeign*) are no more likely to think that globalization is bad for their employment opportunity and stability. Married respondents have more positive evaluation of globalization's effect on their employment which contradicts other findings that married citizens are more protectionist (Goldstein, Margalit, and Rivers 2009; Naoi and Kume 2009), although this results only hold for two out of five models. There is no effect of gender which contradicts the established finding that women are more likely to be protectionist (Hiscox 2006).

Over all, the results presented in Table 1 and 2 suggest that low-income respondents are more protectionist in their assessment of globalization's effect on their own consumer lives and on their employment opportunities. While the latter finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom, the former finding poses an intriguing puzzle to the prevalent view that low-income citizens are primary beneficiaries of globalization as consumers. The association between income of respondents and their protectionist attitudes is more robust for the results for the consumption side (Table 1) than occupational side (Table 2). Moreover, the spill-over hypothesis that low-income citizens' fear of losing jobs "spill over" to form their negative attitudes toward globalization's effect on their consumer lives is thus far rejected. The next section will test the information/knowledge hypothesis.

#### 4.3. Higher Ambiguity in Assessment of Globalization's Effect on Their Own Lives

Table 3 summarizes the determinants of respondents' uncertainty or ambiguity in their attitudes toward globalization. I developed three indices to serve as dependent variables: (i) the "centrist index" is the number of questions, out of the six questions on globalization, for which respondents chose "Neither good or bad"; (ii) "ConsumCentriDK" is a dummy variable equal to one if a respondent chooses "Neither good or bad" or "Don't Know" on the question about their own consumption; and zero otherwise; (iii) "DK index" is the number of questions, out of six, for which respondents chose "Don't Know." (i) and (iii) range from zero to six.

Model (1) tests the determinants of a respondent's score on the "centrist index" with all the respondents with or without jobs. Models (2) and (3) show the determinants of "ConsumCentriDK" and models (4) and (5) show the determinants of the "DK index" score. Except for the model (3) which limits the analysis to working respondents, models include all the respondents with or without jobs.

The results suggest that *Income* is not systematically associated with respondents' uncertainty or ambiguity regarding globalization's effect on their own consumer lives (models (1) to (3)). Low-income citizens, however, are more likely to choose don't know answers to the six questions on the effect of globalization on various aspects of their and Japanese lives. Respondents with college education or higher are less likely to be uncertain across all five models, which is consistent with the finding by Poole and Palfrey (1981), but this effect is absent for the results for DK index (models (4) and (5)). The more progressive a respondent's ideology is, the less likely he/she chooses "Don't

Know” answers, but this finding is weak and inconsistent for the Centrist indexes. Co-op members (who tend to prefer domestically-produced, high-quality food) are less likely to choose a neutral answer for the question about globalization’s effect on consumption which is expected. Co-op members are also less likely to choose don’t know answers. Other measures of ideology, such as support for the Liberal Democratic Party, do not have systematic effects. Female respondents are much more likely to choose “Don’t Know” answers, although at a 99% significance level.

Overall, the results suggest that low-income citizens are more likely to choose don’t know answers for the questions on globalization’s effects than other income groups controlling for education and political orientation. They are, however, no more likely to choose a centrist and don’t know answers about their consumer lives than other income groups. The level of education also has the expected reductive effect on the propensity of neutral answers, yet its substantive impact remains small.

In sum, the results lend some support to the information/knowledge hypothesis. This begs another question: what makes it hard for low-income citizens to assess globalization’s effect on their lives controlling for their levels of education? One possibility is the lack of political parties that represent free trade and consumer interests in Japan. Investigating this question is beyond the scope of this research note, however.

## 5. Conclusion

This research note has summarized the preliminary results from JGSS-2008 which asked Japanese citizens to assess the effect of globalization on six different aspects of their lives. The survey data suggests the puzzle that low-income citizens are more likely to think that globalization is bad for their consumer lives. I have tested the two hypotheses for why this is the case. The results lend some support to the information/knowledge hypothesis, and disconfirm the spill-over hypothesis. The findings summarized in this note suggest two directions for future research. The first is to investigate the role of elites – such as political parties – in shaping citizens’ minds about the effect of globalization on their consumer lives. The second is to disentangle the sources of low-income citizen’s uncertainty about the effect of globalization on their consumer lives. If not the level of education, then, what is it? Possible sources are class-based consumer tastes and socially-constructed shopping habits (Caplovitz 1967).

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**Table 1: Determinants of Protectionist Responses on “Your Consumption”**

	<b>1: All</b>	<b>2: All</b>	<b>3: Working</b>	<b>4: All HH</b>	<b>5: WorkingHH</b>
Income	-0.159 (2.72)***		-0.258 (2.04)**	-0.351 (4.12)***	-0.444 (3.76)***
No Income		-0.169 (0.79)			
Income Low		0.328 (1.99)**			
Incom High		-0.188 (1.31)			
<b>Knowledge/Info</b>					
College	-0.837 (6.74)***	-0.843 (6.76)***	-0.835 (5.28)***	-0.786 (5.91)***	-0.675 (4.04)***
<b>Job Insecurity</b>					
Age	0.012 (3.26)**	0.011 (3.04)**	0.013 (2.04)**	0.0143 (3.18)***	0.019 (2.67)***
Temp			0.095 (0.50)		0.113 (0.57)
Diff Job			-0.104 (0.87)		-0.092 (0.70)
Lose Job			0.060 (0.73)		0.019 (0.22)
No Foreign			0.011 (0.08)		-0.054 (0.32)
Labor Union			-0.029 (0.18)		-0.059 (0.33)
<b>Other Attributes</b>					
Female	0.306 (2.29)**	0.196 (1.36)	0.181 (0.99)	0.589 (4.43)***	0.538 (2.76)***
Married	-0.152 (1.19)	-0.201 (1.57)	-0.301 (1.59)	-0.022 (0.15)	-0.121 (0.58)
LiveKids	0.271 (1.98)**	0.275 (2.02)**	0.319 (1.90)*	0.403 (2.82)***	0.423 (2.43)**
Grocery	-0.063 (0.54)	-0.059 (0.50)	-0.085 (0.54)	-0.076 (0.59)	-0.079 (0.46)
LDP support	-0.014 (0.12)	-0.007 (0.06)	0.079 (0.46)	0.026 (0.21)	0.116 (0.64)
Political	-0.153 (0.64)	-0.15 (0.62)	-0.07 (0.22)	0.033 (0.13)	0.105 (0.32)
Coop Mem	-0.060 (0.45)		-0.202 (1.10)	-0.004 (0.03)	-0.158 (0.84)
Own House	0.118 (1.74)*		0.089 (0.97)	0.038 (0.50)	0.037 (0.39)
Obs	1462	1462	830	1266	735

Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses

\* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%.

Note: Cut points are shown in the appendix.

**Table 2: Determinants of Protectionist Responses to “Your Job Opportunity”**

	<b>1: All</b>	<b>2: All</b>	<b>3: Working</b>	<b>4: All HH</b>	<b>5: Working HH</b>
Income	-0.237 (3.71)***		-0.317 (2.31)**	-0.385 (4.09)***	-0.527 (4.05)***
No Income		0.215 (1.22)			
Income Low		0.170 (0.99)			
Income High		-0.377 (2.37)**			
<b>Knowledge/Info</b>					
College	-0.404 (2.97)***	-0.382 (2.76)*	-0.349 (2.06)**	-0.320 (2.17)**	-0.215 (1.20)
<b>Job Insecurity</b>					
Age	0.009 (2.58)**	0.013 (3.03)***	0.022 (3.07)***	0.015 (3.06)***	0.023 (2.98)***
Temp			0.106 (0.51)		0.226 (1.08)
Diff Job			-0.056 (0.44)		-0.020 (0.14)
Lose Job			0.122 (1.33)		0.101 (1.05)
NoForeign			0.001 (0.01)		-0.060 (0.33)
<b>Other Attributes</b>					
Female	-0.165 (1.13)	-0.156 (1.05)	-0.234 (1.18)	0.155 (1.05)	0.078 (0.37)
Married	-0.234 (1.65)*	-0.215 (1.49)	-0.429 (2.06)**	-0.030 (0.18)	-0.248 (1.08)
LiveKids	0.051 (0.35)*	0.222 (1.69)*	0.266 (1.45)	0.190 (1.12)	0.376 (1.97)**
Grocery	-0.046 (0.36)	-0.047 (0.37)	-0.137 (0.79)	0.027 (0.19)	-0.139 (0.73)
LDP support	-0.157 (1.18)	-0.155 (1.17)	-0.024 (0.13)	-0.131 (0.92)	0.013 (0.07)
Political	0.272 (1.04)	0.270 (1.03)	0.151 (0.44)	0.546 (2.04)**	0.529 (1.51)
Coop Mem	0.037 (0.26)	0.032 (0.22)	-0.010 (0.05)	0.012 (0.08)	-0.101 (0.50)
Own House	0.088 (1.21)	0.088 (1.20)	0.001 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.09)	-0.079 (0.75)
Obs	1358	1358	801	1170	706

Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses

\* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%

Note: Positive coefficients mean more protectionist, negative coefficients mean pro-globalization. Cut points are shown in the appendix.

**Table 3: Determinants of “Centrist” and “Don’t Know” Response Index**

	1	2	3	4	5
	All: Centrist	AllConsum/CentriDK	W: Cons/CentriDK	All: DK Index	All:DK Index
Income	-0.021 (0.17)	-0.006 (0.22)	-0.015 (0.47)	-0.217 (4.95)***	
No Income					0.161 (1.37)
Income Low					0.335 (2.85)***
Incom High					-0.098 (0.85)
<b>Knowledge/Info</b>					
College	-0.440 (2.63)***	-0.087 (2.31)**	-0.084 (2.09)***	-0.023 (0.24)	-0.036 (0.37)
<b>Ideology</b>					
Ideology	-0.059 (0.75)	-0.037 (2.09)**	-0.023 (1.57)	-0.108 (2.50)**	-0.107 (2.48)**
LDPsupport	0.169 (0.94)	-0.052 (1.27)	-0.046 (1.06)	-0.104 (1.11)	-0.102 (1.09)
Political				-0.458 (2.46)**	-0.456 (2.44)**
Coop	-0.166 -0.87	-0.076 (1.76)*	-0.092 (1.97)**	-0.229 (2.25)**	-0.225 (1.09)
<b>Job Insecurity</b>					
Age	-0.009 -1.58	0.001 (0.52)	-0.001 (0.84)	0.019 (7.20)***	0.019 (7.11)***
Diff Job			-0.0243 (0.80)		
Lose Job			0.019 (0.90)		
Foreign			0.013 (0.34)		
Female	0.115 (0.62)	-0.016 (0.38)	-0.021 (0.47)	0.480 (4.84)***	0.460 (4.54)***
Married	-0.109 -0.57	-0.023 -0.53	0.007 (0.17)	-0.289 (3.08)***	-0.309 (3.52)***
LiveKids	0.214 (1.21)	0.095 (2.38)**	0.066 (1.53)	0.210 (2.00)**	0.197 (1.86)*
Grocery	0.062 (0.38)	-0.037 (0.98)	-0.030 (0.73)	-0.276 (3.17)***	-0.275 (3.16)***
Own House	-0.027 (0.33)	-0.018 (0.94)	-0.006 (0.29)	-0.032 (0.63)	-0.032 (0.64)
Constant	1.95 (4.15)***	0.698 (6.57)***	0.674 (5.27)***	0.813 (2.61)**	0.000 (0.00)
Obs	1035	1035	903	1655	1655
R2	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.11	0.11

Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. OLS estimation.

\* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%

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**[Appendix]****Table A-1: Cut Points for Table 1**

	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
Cut 1	-3.689 (0.330)	-3.603 (0.283)	-3.942 (0.531)	-3.472 (0.371)	-3.782 (0.594)
Cut 2	-1.734 (0.281)	-1.645 (0.225)	-1.851 (0.478)	-1.344 (0.317)	-1.419 (0.530)
Cut 3	-0.382 (0.274)	-0.291 (0.217)	-0.433 (0.470)	-0.071 (0.312)	-0.083 (0.525)
Cut 4	2.156 (0.281)	2.248 (0.227)	2.089 (0.478)	2.501 (0.322)	2.493 (0.535)
Cut 5	3.35 (0.297)	3.4356 (0.245)	3.356 (0.500)	3.719 (0.338)	3.741 (0.556)
Cut 6	4.868 (0.359)	4.953 (0.317)	4.684 (0.567)	5.254 (0.403)	5.213 (0.636)

**Table A-2: Cut Points for Table 2**

	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
Cut 1	-4.086 (0.358)	-3.637 (0.327)	-3.526 (0.557)	-3.621 (0.401)	-3.581 (0.620)
Cut 2	-2.538 (0.310)	-2.088 (0.275)	-2.042 (0.516)	-1.956 (0.348)	-1.899 (0.570)
Cut 3	-1.552 (0.301)	-1.102 (0.265)	-1.018 (0.507)	-1.018 (0.341)	-0.917 (0.563)
Cut 4	1.442 (0.300)	1.894 (0.269)	2.036 (0.513)	2.007 (0.346)	2.226 (0.570)
Cut 5	2.757 (0.313)	3.201 (0.284)	3.299 (0.530)	3.313 (0.359)	3.531 (0.588)
Cut 6	4.327 (0.373)	4.780 (0.349)	5.197 (0.634)	4.831 (0.418)	5.444 (0.698)